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According to conventional wisdom, property has disintegrated. Property law 
has undergone many changes since the heyday of Legal Realism, and many 
of these changes were both inspired by Realism and went under the banner 
of the Realists’ “bundle-of-rights” conception of property. However, many of 
the features of property law most denigrated by the Legal Realists and their 
successors have proved surprisingly resilient. These “doctrinal” features 
include the notion of property as a thing, the importance of possessory rights, 
and the greater degree of formalism in property than in contract law. In this 
Article, I argue that there is a common cause to the Realists’ criticism of 
these features and their endurance in the face of that criticism: all of these 
features of property are manifestations of property law’s basic architecture as 
a system. Because of the inherent complexity of relations—especially those 
that are less personalized—in private law, a system for providing a first cut 
at managing these relations presents problems of information costs that are 
unique to property. These costs, usually left out of realist analysis, are hard to 
ignore entirely and push property law to treat private interactions in a more 
modular fashion than the realist bundle-of-rights picture would lead one to 
expect. Moreover, the underappreciated flexibility and robustness of a 
modular architecture allows property law to absorb—at some cost—a great 
deal of change without alteration of its basic nature. I apply this analysis to 
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Realist and post-Realist approaches to asset definition, trespass and nuisance, 
and the standardization of property forms. The greatest engine for change 
from Legal Realism in certain areas of property may be simple ignorance of 
the complexities of earlier law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Nowhere was the realist attack on formalism and classical legal thought 
more vehement than in the area of property. And in keeping with the idea 
that “we are all Realists now,”1 it would appear that property law underwent 
a great deal of change starting in the Legal Realist era. From the revolution 
in landlord–tenant law to a greater willingness to make exceptions to a 
landowner’s right to exclude to the rise of new forms of contractual property, 
the conventional wisdom is that Realism indeed had a profound impact on 
property. In the process, the Realists’ preferred picture of property—the 
bundle of rights—became the reigning dogma and provided justification for 
the change. If any cluster of rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities, 
and so on could be characterized as property, then there was no good reason 
why the bundle of sticks, reflecting the best of current thinking, should not 
be immediately and continuously implemented in the law. The Realists’ 
skepticism of doctrine, and in particular their hostility to property baselines, 
has apparently made a great deal of headway. On the conventional view, 
property is not merely a bundle of rights, but it has even fragmented to the 
 
1 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927–1960 229 (1986); see also, e.g., Brian 
Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 
(1997) (“[A]s the cliché has it . . . ‘we are all realists now.’”); Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism 
Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (reviewing KALMAN, supra note 1) (“All major current 
schools of thought are, in significant ways, products of legal realism. To some extent, we are all 
realists now.”). 
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point that there is nothing holding it together other than the state of 
current policy judgments or prevailing political winds. 
This picture is too tidy in its untidiness. While the changes set in  
motion by the Realists are real, they have not come close to abolishing 
doctrine or fragmenting property out of existence. To the contrary, those 
aspects of property that the Realists saw as the greatest challenge to their 
program have been the most resilient, in practice if not in theory. Property 
is still largely a law of things.2 It provides for in rem rights that show a high 
degree of formalism and standardization.3 This Article will argue that what 
the most stable parts of property share is their relatively tight integration 
with the basic system of property—a system that property law requires 
because of the problems it solves.  
Property law coordinates activities and resolves conflict between members 
of society over external resources. To do this, it must manage the potentially 
intractable complexity of these interactions. Property law must also provide 
a system that channels information where it is needed and cuts it off where 
it is not worthwhile. Property divides the world of horizontal interactions 
into modules, largely surrounding the legal thing, which allow intensive 
activity inside boundaries and stereotyped interactions between modules; 
think of how many activities owners are privileged to take within a parcel, 
which are of no legal relevance to dutyholders. Legal things are not the same as 
actual things, and the legal things can correspond to intangible things.4 
Fundamental to property is the spectrum running from in rem to in  
personam. 5  Some aspects of property—like the basic possessory rights 
protected by trespass and the priority of the true owner’s rights over others’ 
 
2 See Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1725 (2012) 
(“[P]roperty is naturally and for practical purposes seen as a holistic law of things.”). 
3 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 12-20 (2000) (discussing the standardization 
of various categories of property rights, including estates in land, personal property, and 
intellectual property). 
4 See, e.g., J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 115-20 (1997) (discussing intangible 
legal things); Frederick Pollock, What Is a Thing?, 10 LAW Q. REV. 318, 319 (1894) (extending the 
notion of legal things to intangibles); see also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 733 (1917) (A “right, or claim, . . . is 
not always one relating to a thing, i.e., a tangible object . . . .”). 
5 See, e.g., Hohfeld, supra note 4, at 718-33 (discussing the important differences in the nature 
of rights and analyzing in rem rights as congeries of in personam rights); Albert Kocourek, Rights 
in Rem, 68 U. PA. L. REV. 322, 331-35 (1920) (critiquing Hohfeld’s classification of rights and 
offering a definition of in rem rights as those for which “the essential invesititve facts do not serve 
directly to identify the person who owes the incident duty”); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 789-809 (2001) (explaining why it 
is necessary to distinguish between different types of property rights). 
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claims—are in rem, in that they avail against others generally. Other aspects 
of property are more narrowly tailored, falling toward the in personam end 
of the spectrum, including nuisance and lateral support between neighbors, 
covenants, and landlord–tenant.  
This Article will argue that the changes rooted in Realism are concen-
trated on the more in personam–like aspects of property and at the edges of 
the system—and, by the same token, that the overall architecture of property 
has been surprisingly resilient. Or perhaps it is not so surprising; the Article 
will also argue that the persistence of the system or architecture in property 
law is no accident but follows from the function it serves. The “essential 
role” of property is to manage complex interactions of persons at large over 
resources, and the severe informational demands of this problem make some 
such system almost inevitable.6 
There is an irony in this. The Realists’ slogan was that an increasingly 
complex society required less formal and more contextual law in many 
areas, including property.7 Although new problems did require many new 
solutions, the “complexity” of modern society did not remove the need for a 
modular system. Rather, in some ways, it increased the need to manage the 
greater complexity of interactions through that very system.  
This Article will begin in Part I by setting out the nature of the system 
in property law and the Realists’ apparent attack on it. Part II will show 
that some of the most systematic aspects of property have proven quite 
resilient through the present. By contrast, Part III will show that those 
aspects of property that are less embedded in the architecture—either 
because they are in personam or can be characterized as exceptions—have 
been subject to the most realist-inspired change. Part IV addresses the class 
of changes that are more apparent than real, including the “modern” view of 
trespass and the scope of rights extending above and below parcels, as well 
 
6 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 
110 YALE L.J. 387, 391-93 (2000) (arguing that providing for immunity of a firm’s assets from the 
claims of its owners’ creditors is the “essential role” of organization law because it is generally 
impossible to achieve such immunity through contract). 
7 See, e.g., THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 118-35 (1937) (insisting 
that traditional notions of private property were too simple and formal to usefully understand the 
complexity of the contemporary economy); JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 
1870–1970: A HISTORY 147-58 (1990) (explaining the relationship between changes in legal 
doctrine and changes in societyal values); G. EDWARD WHITE, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN LEGAL 
THOUGHT 139 (1978) (discussing the relationship between the Realists’ repudiation of formal 
logic and the advances in society after the Great Depression). For a present day echo of this point 
of view, see RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 231-35 (2013) (arguing against 
formalism and for a new judicial Realism to deal with the increasing complexity of society). 
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as the supposed significance of intangibles for the notion of property as a 
law of things. These themes are drawn together in a Conclusion. 
I. SYSTEM AND ITS DISCONTENTS IN LEGAL REALISM 
The Realists themselves took aim at certain aspects of property, centering 
on the role of things, formalism, and the notion of an in rem right. Their 
objections had roots in earlier sociological and progressive jurisprudence but 
were carried much further, apparently winning the day. In this Part, I 
identify what the Realists found objectionable in property law before 
turning to what their legacy really turned out to be. 
The Realists’ attack on property law was of a piece with their rejection 
of earlier formalism in “classical legal thought.” While the Realists’ charac-
terization of the earlier era can and has been questioned,8 it is especially 
problematic in the area of property. The most famous legacy of realist 
nominalism in property law is the bundle of rights, which eventually was 
accepted as conventional wisdom.9 The bundle of rights is a useful analytic 
device in that it helps to clarify the implications of a set of legal entitlements. 
But it is often taken as much more—as a theory of property. In an earlier 
article, I noted that in keeping with the Realists’ professed love for shallow 
fact-oriented concepts (or facts themselves), the bundle of rights is like the 
extension of a concept—what in the world falls under it.10 But there are 
multiple ways (“intensions”) of getting to this extension. One can pick out a 
set of facts in many different ways, and enumeration is often not the 
 
8 See, e.g., ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 48-112 
(1998) (discussing and criticizing realist-style, antiformalist characterizations of late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century formalism); BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST–
REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING 67-90 (2010) (arguing that the core 
realist observations were already known and utilized before Realism was a formal idea). See 
generally Manuel Cachán, Justice Stephen Field and “Free Soil, Free Labor Constitutionalism”: 
Reconsidering Revisionism, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 541 (2002) (evaluating controversies between 
progressives and revisionists over Justice Field’s ideology and jurisprudence). But see Brian Leiter, 
Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111, 117 (2010) (criticizing 
Tamanaha’s analysis and arguing that “[i]t is not enough to quote this or that judge or scholar 
saying antiformalist, protorealist things in 1880”). 
9 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 26 (1977) 
(reporting that the bundle-of-rights conception of property is so pervasive that “even the dimmest 
law student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual phrases on command”); Edward L. Rubin, 
Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1086 (1984) (“[P]roperty is simply 
a label for whatever ‘bundle of sticks’ the individual has been granted.”); Joan Williams, The 
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 297 (1998) (“Labeling something as property does not 
predetermine what rights an owner does or does not have in it.”). 
10 Henry E. Smith, Emergent Property, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY 
LAW 320 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013). 
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cheapest or most useful method of doing so. Thus, while fee simple to 
Blackacre may involve all sorts of rights (e.g., to exclude people from 
entering but not from viewing, to demand lateral support from a neighbor, 
and to alienate), privileges of use (e.g., to build, to till, and to park), duties 
(e.g., to shovel snow from adjacent sidewalks), and liabilities (e.g., to 
eminent domain), some of these sets of relations are open-ended privileges 
of use in general, subject to limits from others’ rights. Their open-
endedness precludes enumeration of the sticks in the “bundle” accompany-
ing the fee simple to Blackacre.  
Moreover, the realist bundle of rights was built on Hohfeld’s scheme of 
legal relations,11 which itself can be understood in various ways. It is no 
doubt a useful analytical device, but taken as a “theory” of the structure of 
legal relations, it is incomplete, as Hohfeld may well have known: he died 
before being able to supplement his reductive theory with a theory of 
composite or aggregates of relations.12 
Likewise, the Realists’ vision of property was characterized by a 
Hohfeldian skepticism of the in rem aspect of property. In one famous 
formulation, Walton Hamilton and Irene Till declared that property is 
nothing more than “a euphonious collocation of letters which serves as a 
general term for the miscellany of equities that persons hold in the  
commonwealth.” 13  More extreme still was Felix Cohen, who took the 
reification of property as Exhibit A in his catalog of “Transcendental 
 
11 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913) (setting out eight “fundamental jural relations” and their 
interrelations); see also Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1146-63 (1938) 
(interpreting the Hohfeldian scheme from a legal Realist’s point of view).  
12 See, e.g., JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 55, 67 (1990) (adding  
“cluster-rights” to the Hohfeldian scheme); Pierre Schlag, How to Do Things With Hohfeld, 78 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 217-18 (2015) (pointing out that Hohfeld did in fact use the word 
“aggregate” when he said that the fee simple “can be broken down into ‘a complex aggregate of 
rights (or claims), privileges, powers, and immunities’ . . . .”); see also Daniel B. Klein & John 
Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property Symposium, 8 ECON. J. WATCH 193 
(Sept. 2011), http://econjwatch.org/articles/property-a-bundle-of-rights-prologue-to-the-property-
symposium?ref=articles, archived at http://perma.cc/6AM6-Q8MK (describing the history of the 
“bundle-of-rights” conception of property); Ted Sichelman, Quantum Game Theory and Coordina-
tion in Intellectual Property (San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 10-035, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656625 (describing how Hohfeld’s theory could be used in patent law). 
For an argument that a Hohfeldian approach leads to the primacy of the right to exclude from a 
physical thing, see Simon Douglas & Ben McFarlane, Defining Property Rights, in  
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 219, 223-26, 233-37.  
13 Walton H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL  
SCIENCES 528, 528 (Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1937).  
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Nonsense.”14 During this era, the First Restatement of Property adopted a 
Hohfeldian bundle-of-rights approach and studiously avoided the notion of 
an in rem right.15 
Some Realists charted a more moderate course when it came to property. 
Llewellyn, for instance, espoused a minimal role for concepts of title despite 
criticism of that notion’s role in the earlier sales act.16 He was not opposed 
to concepts in general but rather saw concepts—like title—under the older 
sales act as too abstract; 17  instead, Llewellyn, and Realists like him, 
“want[ed] to check ideas, and rules, and formulas by facts, to keep them 
close to facts.”18 Nevertheless, he found that the concept of title was useful 
precisely because it could be inserted as a unit at various points where a 
more tailored concept was not needed and thus that “it should be made to 
serve merely as the general residuary clause.”19 
Llewellyn’s moderate position bears some resemblance to Roscoe 
Pound’s earlier suggestion that different areas of law require different 
degrees of formalism, with property being among those areas that benefit 
from the stability that formalism provides.20 Not a formalist himself but in 
a sense a proto-Realist, Pound argued that 
 
14 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 815 (1935) (“The circularity of legal reasoning in the whole field of unfair competition is 
veiled by the ‘thingification’ of property.”). In his first paragraph, Cohen joined Jhering in 
ridiculing the “heaven of legal concepts”: “In this heaven one met, face to face, the many concepts 
of jurisprudence in their absolute purity, freed from all entangling alliances with human life. Here 
were the disembodied spirits of good faith and bad faith, property, possession, laches, and rights in 
rem.” Id. at 809. 
15 See RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 7 (1936) (“The word ‘owner’, as it is used in this Restatement, 
means the person who has one or more interests.”); see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, Why Restate the Bundle?: The Disintegration of the Restatement of Property, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 
681, 696-701 (2014) (explaining how the Restatement was largely based on the legal concepts 
formulated by Hohfeld that minimized the distinction between in personam and in rem right). 
The move away from in rem rights in the name of maintaining rights among persons was quite 
conscious, as the floor discussion of the Restatement makes clear. Id. at 697-99. 
16 See K.N. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 159, 169 
(1938) (“[Title] remains, in the Sales field, an alien lump, undigested.”). 
17 See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 
438-51 (1930) (distinguishing between abstract legal verbalisms and concrete empirical facts while 
highlighting the inherent ambiguities of concepts).  
18 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. 
REV. 1222, 1223 (1931). Llewellyn continues: “They view rules, they view law, as means to ends; as 
only means to ends; as having meaning only insofar as they are means to ends.” Id. 
19 Llewellyn, supra note 16, at 170. See generally Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in 
Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097 (2012) (reevaluating the roles that legal concepts play in 
property and concluding that such concepts manage the complexity of interpersonal interactions 
and reduce information costs). 
20 See Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision III: A Theory of Judicial Decision for Today, 
36 HARV. L. REV. 940, 951 (1923) (“[R]ules of law . . . which are applied mechanically are more 
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[i]n matters of property and commercial law, where the economic forms of 
the social interest in the general security—security of acquisitions and  
security of transactions—are controlling, mechanical application of fixed, 
detailed rules or of rigid deductions from fixed conceptions is a wise social 
engineering. . . . Individualization of application and standards that  
regard the individual circumstances of each case are out of place here.21  
Jerome Frank vehemently faulted Pound’s position as being unrealistically 
rule-bound when it came to property.22 
At least at the rhetorical level, the more extreme realist position became 
conventional wisdom among commentators in the late twentieth century. 
Thomas Grey offered the most famous modern formulation of the  
post-realist position: 
In the English-speaking countries today, the conception of property held by 
the specialist (the lawyer or economist) is quite different from that held by 
the ordinary person. Most people, including most specialists in their unpro-
fessional moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons. 
To own property is to have exclusive control of something—to be able to 
use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, leave it idle, or destroy it. Legal 
restraints on the free use of one’s property are conceived as departures from 
an ideal conception of full ownership. 
By contrast, the theory of property rights held by the modern specialist 
tends both to dissolve the notion of ownership and to eliminate any necessary 
connection between property rights and things. Consider ownership first. 
The specialist fragments the robust unitary conception of ownership into a 
more shadowy “bundle of rights.”23  
 
adapted to property and to business transactions; standards where application proceeds upon 
intuition are more adapted to human conduct and to the conduct of enterprises.”). 
21 ROSCOE POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 153-54 (1923). 
22 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 213 (1930) (“Pound errs, that is, in 
too sharply differentiating between (a) one department of law which requires the application of 
abstract rules and (b) another department which calls for the just and painstaking study of the 
novel facts of the particular case. This as we have seen, is an unreal dichotomy. Every case 
presents the question of the extent to which the judge should adhere to settled precedents as 
against flexible modification of the precedents. There must be gradations and degrees of fixity and 
flexibility.”); see also FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS: AN ESSAY ON 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM 1-8, 235-49 (1933) (arguing that the connection of any 
decision or element of a legal system to the rest of the law only has meaning in a social and ethical 
context).  
23 Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII, at 69, 69 (J. 
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (citations omitted). 
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Grey further argues that the notion that things are important to property 
cannot stand in the face of the importance of intangibles to a modern 
capitalist economy.24 Grey then goes on to note that the bundle-of-rights 
conception makes property law unimportant; this was a welcome development 
for the Legal Realists, who “were on the whole supportive of the regulatory 
and welfare state, and in the writings that develop the bundle-of-rights 
conception, a purpose to remove the sanctity that had traditionally attached 
to the rights of property can often be discerned.”25 
The Realists’ caricature of formalists can be seen as an effort to distract 
from the strengths of traditional property, which they realized was an 
obstacle. The Realists employed mutually reinforcing rhetorical strategies to 
great effect. First, their criticism of earlier law as overly formal was  
designed to make their opponents look ridiculous and narrow-minded. As 
several authors have pointed out, this effort at “defining your enemy” was 
effective but not entirely accurate.26 Indeed, the formalism of the formalist 
era was more pragmatic than the stereotype would have it. In addition, the 
Realists focused on the common law, which in the era before the fusion of 
law and equity was indeed more formalist than it would have been on its 
own because it was not freestanding.27  However, equity tempered the 
common law, and even notorious “formalists” like Langdell spent much 
effort on equity and saw it as a morally based engine of reform in the legal 
system.28 Indeed, it was Holmes who dismissed equity and focused on 
packing everything into the common law structure.29 
 
24 Id. at 70. However, this logic does not follow. See Pollock, supra note 4, at 320 (“[O]n the 
whole perhaps we have good ground for saying that the ‘thing’ of legal contemplation, even when 
we have to do with a material object, is not precisely the object as we find it in common experi-
ence, but rather the entirety of its possible legal relations to persons. We say entirety, not sum, 
because the capacity of being conceived as a distinct whole is a necessary attribute of an individual 
thing. What the relations of a person to a thing can be must depend in fact on the nature of the 
thing as continuous or discontinuous, corporeal or incorporeal, and in law on the character and the 
extent of the powers of use and disposal which particular systems of law may recognize.”); see also 
PENNER, supra note 4, at 115-22 (analyzing intangibles in terms of exclusion and separability 
theses); FREDERICK POLLOCK, A FIRST BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE FOR STUDENTS OF THE 
COMMON LAW 121 (1896) (“A thing is, in law, some possible matter of rights and duties 
conceived as a whole and apart from all others, just as, in the world of common experience, 
whatever can be separately perceived is a thing.”). 
25 Grey, supra note 23, at 81. 
26 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
27 See generally Henry Smith, The Hidden Equitable Langdell – Henry Smith, NEW PRIVATE L. 
BLOG (Aug. 10, 2015), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/08/10/the-hidden-equitable-
langdell-henry-smith/, archived at http://perma.cc/6QD5-EMQF. 
28 See C.C. Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction II, 1 HARV. L. REV. 111, 116 (1887) 
(“[T]he object of equity, in assuming jurisdiction over legal rights, is to promote justice by 
supplying defects in the remedies which the courts of law afford. . . . [T]he jurisdiction is  
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The Realists’ characterization of their opponents as mindless formalists 
was accompanied by a phobia about natural rights and natural law.30 Felix 
Cohen’s Transcendental Nonsense is itself probably a reference to Bentham’s 
assessment of lists of natural rights as “nonsense upon stilts.”31 Realists saw 
property doctrine as an obstacle to social engineering. Natural rights 
thinking was in decline by the time the Realists arrived, and they saw the 
remnants of such an approach as an impediment to redefining entitlements. 
The over-constitutionalization of private law, now symbolized by the 
Lochner case,32 allowed the Realists to paint with a broad brush; they set up 
a dichotomy between a fully protean, context-based Realism in property 
and the most rigid version of classical liberalism enshrined in a  
hard-to-amend Constitution.  
Finally, a word on what is meant by “system.” The Legal Realists saw 
themselves as systematists, but in a functionalist sense. They saw the “what” 
of law as holding it together, not the “how.” Thus economic, political, or 
sociological concepts might be relevant, but not traditional legal concepts. 
Nothing in the following should be taken as an argument against functionalism 
itself. Indeed, the system within law—made up of concepts and doctrines—
can (notwithstanding the views of the Realists and their successors) be 
given a functionalist justification in that the system attains the benefits of 
complexity while also managing its costs. 
II. THE PERSISTENCE OF SYSTEM 
The Realists did not do justice to the system immanent in property—
not that it was their intention. Indeed, Realists saw any inkling of a system 
 
co-extensive with its object; that is, equity assumes jurisdiction over legal rights so far, and so far 
only, as justice can be thereby promoted.”). For further evidence and discussion on equity as a 
vehicle for reform, see Smith, supra note 27. 
29 See O.W. Holmes, Jr., Early English Equity, 1 LAW Q. REV. 162, 173-74 (1885) (describing 
the development of equity and arguing that equity was merely a “relic[] of ancient custom,” not a 
major reform or new doctrine). Indeed, Holmes’s focus on the common law excluded equity. See 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“I hardly think it 
advisable to shape general theory from [equity].”). 
30 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Custom in American Property Law: A Vanishing Act, 48 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 507, 519 (2013) (discussing positivism’s displacement of natural law and natural rights in 
the nineteenth century). See generally John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, The Forgotten Jurisprudential 
Debate: Catholic Legal Thought’s Response to Legal Realism, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1203 (2015).  
31  JEREMY BENTHAM, Nonsense Upon Stilts, in RIGHTS, REPRESENTATION, AND RE-
FORM: NONSENSE UPON STILTS AND OTHER WRITINGS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 317 
(Philip Schofield et al. eds., 2002); see also Cohen, supra note 14, at 848 (praising Bentham’s 
“brilliant achievements”). 
32 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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as a roadblock. As this Article will show, that roadblock could be removed 
rhetorically but not practically. It is time to consider what property does, 
and how it does it. 
Traditional property, whether being of a natural law, natural rights, or 
the late nineteenth-century kind (or even a conventionalist version), did 
feature a system. Less recognized is its subtlety and flexibility. 
In property law, things are the lynchpin of the architecture. The Realists 
and their successors are correct in noting the complexity of horizontal 
private interactions between members of society with respect to things. 
They are also right that property is more than the relation between an 
owner and a thing. Nonetheless, it is the very complexity of the problem of 
horizontal interactions and its interpersonal nature that requires a method 
of making the problem more manageable. That method is to modularize the 
system, starting with the definition of legal things.33 
Legal relations are not delineated from the ground up in terms of pairs 
of individuals, individual activities, and the attributes of the resources they 
involve34—that is, by directly specifying the right of A against B for narrow 
use C of resource attribute D, and so on. Instead of a fully atomized system, 
property law carves up the world using notions of possession and accession 
into legal things.35 A legal thing is related to, but distinct from, an actual 
thing, but there is a legal ontology that allows one to recognize pieces of 
reality as separable from the overall context. The owner of a thing can take 
many actions internal to the legal thing without it being relevant to the 
outside world. For example, the law of trespass, as with exclusion strategies 
in general, implements this basic modular setup. It creates a simple message 
for potential trespassers, such as to a person walking through a parking lot 
who knows not to take or damage cars belonging to unknown others.36  
 
33 See Smith, supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
34 See Brian Angelo Lee & Henry E. Smith, The Nature of Coasean Property, 59 INT’L REV. 
ECON. 145 (2012) (“The real lesson of the Coase Theorem is that the presence of transaction costs 
in the real world makes property a sometimes essential shortcut over full contracting.”); Thomas 
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 
357, 358 (2001) (“[T]he in rem character of property and its consequences are vital to an understanding 
of property as a legal and economic institution.” (citation omitted)). 
35 See Henry E. Smith, The Elements of Possession (“Possession is still used when it is all we 
need—a rough and ready system to handle numerous, low-stakes interactions.”), in THE LAW AND 
ECONOMICS OF POSSESSION 65, 96 (Yun-chien Chang ed., 2015). 
36 See PENNER, supra note 4, at 75-76 (“As I walk through a car park, my actual, practical 
duty is only capable of being understood as a duty which applies to cars there, not to a series of 
owners.  . . . The content of my duty not to interfere is not structured in any way by the actual 
ownership relation of the cars’ owners to their specific cars.”). 
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For spillovers and collective action problems, these components of the 
system, “modules,” must be enriched at their interfaces with more targeted 
rules and standards. Thus, the law of nuisance, along with easements and 
covenants, is tied more closely to particular uses, and nuisance is a mixture 
of exclusion and a heavy dose of governance.37 More complex modular 
separation of sets of functions (such as management or enjoyment) coupled 
with governance rules to contain strategic behavior leads to “entity property.”38 
Employing things as a starting point also makes defining in rem rights 
easier because communicating the boundaries of a thing—especially when 
that thing emerges through spontaneous possessory customs—is easier than 
promulgating lists of permitted and forbidden actions with respect to 
resources and parties. Likewise, the residual claim is defined in terms of 
what is left of the legal thing after more specific claims run out. And 
transfer is facilitated to the extent that legal things are decontextualized, 
especially depersonalized. These functions are enhanced by the widespread 
adoption of the same inventory of types of things, with network effects on 
the receiving side of the communication.39 
This role of system in property is not well captured in the bundle of 
rights. There is no stick corresponding to the glue that “thinghood”  
provides in this set-up. The Realists were accepting of the right to exclude 
because they viewed it as one narrow stick among others.40 What they could 
not abide was the notion of property as a law of things, because then it 
would be answerable to the everyday morality that tracks things, and to the  
considerations of system that thing-based modularity provides. In a sense, 
Legal Realists implicitly saw “thinghood” as a threat because it fit into an 
alternative and competing method of addressing the complexity for which 
they were offering their own solutions. 
 
37 See generally Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).  
38 See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
39 See generally Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus 
Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 15-20 (2012); Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 
45-49; see also Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1105, 1145 (2003) (“The network benefits from doing the same thing as others may dominate 
the advantages of special forms.”). 
40 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 373-74 
(1954) (discussing the right to exclude in the context of property law); see also Adam Mossoff, The 
Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2009 (2009) 
(“[T]he legal realists reconceptualized property entitlements into both nominalist and positivist 
terms, popularizing within American property law the bundle metaphor and its attendant 
emphasis on the right to exclude as the essential characteristic of the legal right to property.”); 
Henry E. Smith, The Thing About Exclusion, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 95, 113-17 
(2014) (examining the importance of the legal thing “in the delineation of legal relations”). 
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*      *      * 
 
If the modular system of property law solves an important problem, 
then it should be difficult to depart from this system. And so it is. If 
anything, the complexity of interactions with respect to resources has 
increased along with the technology for processing information.41 Thus, the 
expected direction of change in this area is indeterminate without more 
empirical information. Nevertheless, it can safely be said that the completely 
articulated hyper-realist version of the bundle of rights is as much of a  
non-starter as ever. In other words, property law performs an “essential 
role” by providing structures that are (still) impossible to achieve solely 
through contract.  
Thus, it should come as no surprise that aspects of the property system 
most closely associated with its architecture have changed little since the 
realist era. Consider land records. Despite a crystals-and-mud dynamic in 
their early era,42 systems of recording have been persistent.43 States that 
settled on notice or race-notice have remained that way. The few remaining 
race jurisdictions (in which the first to record has priority regardless of bad 
faith) have slowly adopted one of the other systems, but there has not been 
a lot of activity in this area. The recording system is designed to furnish 
notice of in rem claims to the widest possible audience of transactors and 
other parties, such as taxing authorities.44 And once in place, recording 
systems, and to a lesser extent registration systems, which require more 
ongoing effort and expertise, are remarkably stable over time.45 The major 
 
41 See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350 
(1967) (stating that adjustments in property rights’ “viability in the long run will depend on how 
well they modify behavior to accommodate to the externalities associated with important changes 
in technology . . . .”); Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 40-42 (discussing the relationship 
between technology and the numerus clausus principle). See generally Smith, supra note 37 (offering 
modifications to Demsetzian theory to allow for a variety of institutional responses to changes in 
background conditions, including technology). 
42 Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578 (1988) (defining 
“crystals” as “perfectly clear, open and shut, demarcations of entitlement” and “mud” as “fuzzy, 
ambiguous rules of decision”). 
43 See Henry E. Smith, Rose’s Human Nature of Property, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1047, 
1052-53 (2011) (examining Carol Rose’s examples in light of the alternative principle of sedimentation). 
44 The notice furnished by registration systems is more definitive and may be thought to 
have a more “in rem” effect.  
45 Registration systems that get backlogged become in effect recordation systems. For example, 
the registration system in Cook County, Illinois, fell behind and was eventually dropped in favor 
of recording. See BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF IMPERSONAL 
EXCHANGE: THEORY AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 66 (2012) (“[F]or registries 
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revolution currently underway is electronic recordkeeping. This is expected 
to impact the search required of transactors and thus broaden the notion of 
constructive notice.46 Yet, so far, the contours of the system remain the 
same; there has been no revolution in recording law comparable to that in 
landlord–tenant law. 
Likewise, the system of surveying is fundamental to delineating property 
rights in land. As Libecap and Lueck have shown, this choice has important 
impacts on economic development.47 Once such a system is chosen, it tends 
not to be changed.48 Even the pattern of street layouts tends to show path 
dependence (figuratively and literally).49 The rise of GPS technology may 
reduce errors, especially in metes-and-bounds systems, but as in the case of 
recording, technology is leading to improvements rather than revolution. 
The system of basic forms of property has also remained stable—
perhaps too stable.50 The catalog of estates can be regarded as a loose 
version of the numerus clausus—the closed menu of forms familiar from civil 
law.51 In American property law, the basic vocabulary in which the forms 
are cast derives from feudalism, although there have certainly been some 
 
to function properly, governments must be prepared to provide registrars with sound and strong 
incentives.”). 
46 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
927 (2d ed. 2012) (“As long as records can be searched electronically by grantor and grantee, the 
type of search that is cost-effective increases, which can be expected to create pressure to expand 
the notions of . . . constructive notice.”). See generally Emily Bayer-Pacht, The Computerization of 
Land Records: How Advances in Recording Systems Affect the Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of 
Title Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (2010) (examining in depth the impact of electronic land 
records on existing principles of property law). 
47 See generally Gary D. Libecap & Dean Lueck, The Demarcation of Land and the Role of Coor-
dinating Property Institutions, 119 J. POL. ECON. 426 (2011) (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of 
two systems of property demarcation and finding the rectangular survey system superior to the 
metes and bounds approach). 
48 See Gary D. Libecap et al., Large-Scale Institutional Changes: Land Demarcation in the British 
Empire, 54 J.L. & ECON. S295, S321-22 (2011) (concluding that demarcation regimes persist 
because of the costs associated with changing such a system). 
49 See Robert C. Ellickson, The Law and Economics of Street Layouts: How a Grid Pattern  
Benefits a Downtown, 64 ALA. L. REV. 463, 484-88 (2013) (surveying the path dependence of 
development of various U.S. cities). 
50 The categories or labels persist despite the functional closeness of some interests as a result 
of changes in the rules governing alienability and destruction. See THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. 
HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 115 (2d ed. 1984) (stating 
that “if executory interests and remainders are pretty much the same today,” this means that “their 
labels have become functionless”).  
51 See, e.g., Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem 
(“In all ‘non-feudal’ systems with which I am familiar .  . . there are less than a dozen sorts of 
property entitlements.”), in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 239, 241 (John 
Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987). See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 3 (providing an  
in-depth discussion of numerus clausus). 
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additions and subtractions from the menu, mainly from legislation. The 
abolition of the fee tail and the replacement of dower and curtesy by the 
spousal elective forced share are prominent examples,52 and future interests 
have acquired a greater degree of alienability.53 However, the basic menu 
has not changed much over the last one hundred years. Arguably we could 
adopt a more streamlined version of the system, such as the one that 
England achieved by legislation in 1925,54 which also set up the first effective 
registration system in that country. One might even characterize it as a 
remodularization of the system.  
Basic thing definition has also barely changed in its basic contours. In 
everyday life, possessory norms are largely unchanged from what they were 
one hundred years ago.55 New “things” have been defined, especially in the 
intangible arena, to which I will return. However, the process of defining a 
thing, which requires separation from context and definition of violations in 
a binary (and thus in a sense “exclusionary”) fashion, is also remarkably 
stable over time. Again, we may be able to verify some of the dimensions of 
such assets better now with electronic records and communication, but, at 
one remove, the process is a familiar one.  
Finally, the stability of the systemic aspects of American property law is 
also indicated by the affinities that so-called “exclusion theorists” in the 
United States have for Commonwealth property theory.56 It is no accident 
that those who take the most architectural view find the most in common 
with that literature. 
 
52 Merrill & Smith, supra note 3, at 66. 
53 See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.68-4.70 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (describing 
alienability of rights of entry for future interests); T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future Interests, 60 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513, 515-20 (2003) (documenting the trend towards alienation of future 
interests and advocating its completion). 
54 Law of Property Act 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5 c.20. 
55 By the same token, basic possessory norms bear a great resemblance to each other across 
societies. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Inevitable Trend Toward Universally Recognizable Signals of 
Property Claims: An Essay for Carol Rose, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1015, 1032 (2011) (“[T]here 
has been an inevitable trend toward a universal sign language of property claiming.”). 
56 See, e.g., J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 30-32, 119-61 (1996) (discussing the concept 
of ownership in property law). See generally BEN MCFARLANE, THE STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY 
LAW 132-54 (2008) (discussing the importance of exclusive control to the content of a property 
right); PENNER, supra note 4 (providing an analytical overview of property law); Penner & Smith, 
Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at xv (describing theories of 
property law). 
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III. NONSYSTEMIC CHANGES IN DOCTRINE 
Despite this stability, vast swaths of property law have changed a great 
deal. Consistent with this Article’s thesis about the importance and persis-
tence of system in property law, these significant changes tend to be 
concentrated in the more in personam, less architecturally significant parts 
of property law. Aspects of property law that have changed the most tend to 
be more detachable from the rest of the field. 
Susceptibility to change is inversely related to standardization. Merrill 
and I have argued that, in a manner consistent with the information cost 
theory of the standardization of in rem rights, those aspects of property that 
are less standardized—i.e., more customizable—tend to be less in rem.57 
The wider and more impersonal an audience that a claim has to reach, the 
more standardized it needs to be so that it does not impose information-cost 
burdens in excess of information benefits.58 We selected four areas perched 
between property and contract—landlord–tenant, trusts, bailments, and 
security interests—and we showed that standardization exhibits the pattern 
we expect. The most in rem aspect of each area is the most standardized, 
and the in personam the least. We identified intermediate areas as those 
where duty bearers are either numerous (like in rem) but definite (like in 
personam) or few in number (like in personam) but indefinite (like in rem), 
and we demonstrated that, as expected, they show an intermediate degree of 
standardization.59  
There is a dynamic side to this story, related to the differential impact of 
Legal Realism. Thus, the most famous area of change in the last fifty years 
has been in landlord–tenant law.60 But the changes have occurred in the 
more contractual aspects of the landlord–tenant relationship. Moving from 
independent covenants to dependent covenants brought leases into  
alignment with modern contract law. In more intermediate situations that 
might involve numerous contracts for one landlord, implied warranties of 
habitability and the mitigation of damages were borrowed with modification 
from contract and consumer protection law. Even when these doctrines look 
 
57 See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 5. 
58 Id.; see also Smith, supra note 39 at 1148-57 (analyzing informational tradeoff and arguing 
that it is a partial explanation for several themes of property law). 
59 See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 5. 
60 See generally Roger A. Cunningham, The New Implied and Statutory Warranties of Habitability 
in Residential Leases: From Contract to Status, 16 URB. L. ANN. 3 (1979) (describing the emergence 
and evolution of the concept of warranty of habitability); Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation 
of American Landlord–Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503 (1982) (examining the divergence of 
residential and commercial landlord–tenant law). 
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more like regulation than classic contract law doctrine itself, they can be 
regarded as regulating an in personam or intermediate relation.61 
External, or in rem, aspects of the lease are much more resistant to 
change.62 For example, despite criticism, the system of assignments and 
subleases is largely intact, with the main reform being a more contextualized 
inquiry into the intent of the parties to create one or the other. The  
requirements of privity of estate and touch-and-concern for the running of 
lease covenants are highly formalistic but potentially impact more than the 
parties at hand; accordingly, they have been less susceptible to change than 
the more purely contractual aspects of leasing. The notion of a lease as 
property retains much of its force, despite the disparagement it receives in 
the process of reforming its contractual aspects; courts have proclaimed that 
the idea is antiquated and feudal, and often note that the modern lease is a 
contract for services.63 Still, it remains true that the tenant is no less a 
possessor than ever and can invoke trespass as before. Even the inventory of 
tenancies—at will, term of years, periodic, and at sufferance—is largely 
unchanged.64 Likewise, a few courts have experimented with loosening the 
requirements for a term of years, but they have not done away with the set 
 
61 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 822-33 (analyzing developments of landlord–tenant 
law in more in personam and in rem relations). 
62 See id. at 831-33 (explaining that information costs increase when any customization is 
permitted, regardless of the content of specific contracts).  
63 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“The city 
dweller who seeks to lease an apartment on the third floor of a tenement has little interest in the 
land 30 or 40 feet below, or even in the bare right to possession within the four walls of his 
apartment. When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek ‘shelter’ today, they seek a 
well-known package of goods and services—a package which includes not merely walls and 
ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure 
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.” (citing NAT’L COMM’N ON 
URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-34, at 9 (1968))). See 
generally Glendon, supra note 60, at 509 (“[T]he lease has long been a hybrid of many strains: 
contract and conveyance, personal and real property, promise and covenant.”). 
64 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 832 (identifying the types of leases and explaining 
that modification is not permitted as an extension of the numerus clausus principle). The rare 
counterexample helps prove the point. Thus, in Garner v. Gerrish, the court apparently enforced a 
lease for life as being no different from a life estate because seisin is outmoded. 473 N.E.2d 223, 
224-25 (N.Y. 1984). The opinion abounds with references to feudalism and invokes the Holmesian 
cliché that it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule than it was laid down in the time of 
Henry IV, but the Garner court never bothers to mention whether landlord–tenant protections 
would apply. The opinion has not had much impact—and was quite possibly wrong from the point 
of view of tenant protection on the facts. See Bernie D. Jones, Garner v. Gerrish and the Renter’s 
Life Estate: Teaching a New Concept of “Home,” 2 FAULKNER L. REV. 1, 4 (2010) (presenting 
evidence that the lease was infected with unconscionability and undue influence on the landlord). 
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of pigeonholes that leads to problems with devices like leases “for the 
duration of the war.”65 
Similarly, in bailments, commentators have advocated simplifying  
bailment duties, and courts have tinkered with them.66 Nevertheless, the 
difference between strict liability for misdelivery and reasonable care for 
damage and theft may be puzzling, but it is persistent. Likewise, the rules 
about ostensible ownership implying the very mild duty of third parties to 
know about the bailment have not changed much. 
In trusts, as well, the internal rules have changed more than have the 
external ones, although there are some exceptions. The argument that trusts 
are like contracts—a type of third-party beneficiary contract—is invoked 
when changes in the fiduciary standard are in play.67 The rules for good 
faith purchase from a trustee have not, however, changed much. (The 
exceptions have to do with tracing, to which I return.) Nor have most of the 
legal rights of the trustee vis-à-vis third parties. 
Finally, security interests and mortgages have changed around the  
periphery, but the basic structure remains the same. Security interests in 
personal property are governed by the U.C.C. The main recent changes 
have been modifications to the rules for superpriority and expanding the 
role of possession.68 In the area of mortgages, courts have historically used a 
substance-over-form approach, forcing transactions with the substance of 
mortgages to be treated as mortgages, with an eye to preserving the judicial 
protections of mortgagors. This has third party effects, and nowhere more 
than in mortgage law have judicial innovations had something close to in 
rem effects (even though they were equitable interventions). Unlike some 
of the Realists (other than Llewellyn), we should be on the lookout for 
changes that purport to be isolated but are actually more widespread than 
 
65 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 832 (“Contractual modification is not permitted; if 
the parties create a novel type of lease, it will be categorized as being of one of the four recognized 
types .  . . .”). Compare Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Kalis, 191 F.2d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 1951) (finding 
lease terminating sixty days after the end of World War II to be a tenancy at will), with Smith’s 
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Hawkins, 50 A.2d 267, 268 (D.C. 1946) (finding a similar provision to 
be a lease for a term of years). 
66 See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 5, at 811-20 (detailing developments in bailment law). 
67 See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
646-47 (1995) (arguing that trusts are a kind of third party beneficiary contract); see also FRANK 
H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
8-35 (1991) (analyzing corporations in terms of contracting); Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic 
Theory of Fiduciary Law (discussing fiduciary duties in the context of trusts), in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW 197, 202-03 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).  
68 See generally Steven O. Weise, U.C.C. Article 9: Personal Property Secured Transactions, 62 BUS. 
LAW. 1633 (2007) (discussing the effects of U.C.C. Article 9’s revision on existing property law). 
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intended because reformers are unaware of the interconnectedness of legal 
concepts. Of course, these interventions long preceded the realist era.69 
The Restatements of Property confirm the proposition that reform has 
concentrated in the more in personam and governance-oriented aspects of 
property. Unlike contracts and torts, the First Restatement did not cover 
the entire subject of property.70 The Second and Third Restatements were, 
for the most part, self-consciously reform efforts. It is striking that they 
concentrated on the more in personam aspects of property, including land-
lord–tenant, mortgages, trusts, and servitudes. There has been a lot of 
attention paid to wills, which are also best seen as toward the in personam 
side—a transfer between two parties. Such transfers affect the rights of 
others in that a new owner has in rem rights, but this is equally true of any 
contract for the transfer of property. At the same time, the Second and 
Third Restatements left untouched important topics in property with a 
more in rem aspect, such as adverse possession and recording.71 
 
69 See, e.g., A.H. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 
1062-65 (1933) (showing that moratory legislation has been passed by a variety of civilizations 
since the time of Ancient Greece); Rose, supra note 42, at 583-85 (documenting the reform of 
“crystalline” mortgage rules into vaguer, “muddier” mortgage rules in England during the late 
seventeenth century); Robert H. Skilton, Developments in Mortgage Law and Practice, 17 TEMP. 
L.Q. 315, 316 (1943) (“Mortgage law has always been subject to great changes.”); see also Sheldon 
Tefft, The Myth of Strict Foreclosure, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 576 (1937) (arguing that history shows 
“that English mortgagors at the beginning of the nineteenth century were better protected against 
overreaching than under the system which has been developed in the most liberal American 
institution”).  
70 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 15, at 681 (“Even after 17 volumes produced over 75 years, 
the Restatement of Property offers no treatment of adverse possession, ignores most of the law of 
personal property, says nothing about real estate transfers, recording acts, groundwater and 
mineral rights, or eminent domain, and does not touch intellectual property.”). 
71 Further confirmation of this Article’s thesis comes from the work of professed latter-day 
Realist Hanoch Dagan. For him, judges play an important role in reshaping (predictably) each 
free-standing property “institution,” such as personal property, marital property, and mortgages, 
and issues of architecture are simply denied. See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES 
AND INSTITUTIONS (2011); Hanoch Dagan, Inside Property, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2013). It 
should be noted that I emphasize the idea of governance in Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 
37, and my subsequent work. Thus, Dagan is quite wrong that it requires downplaying the 
significance of governance or the importance of the changes Realists wrought to note that the 
Realists exaggerate the architectural or systemic implications of Realism. See id. at S455 (arguing 
“that exclusion and governance are strategies that are at the poles of a continuum of methods of 
measurement”); see also Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1855 
n.3 (2012) (“Smith’s conceptions of exclusion and governance both involve managing ownership’s 
external dimension: the relationship between owners and nonowners.”). But see, e.g., Smith, supra 
note 37, S455 n.5 (“‘Governance’ here just refers to a high degree of delineation of rights to 
resources in terms of use, and governance can be supplied by norms, regulation, or contract. This 
dovetails with prior usage, because we often use the term ‘governance’ to refer to the norms of use 
in common-pool regimes, to the exercise of the power of the state, and to organization of 
economic activity through contractual restrictions.”). On the latter, see generally, for example, 
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Part of the attraction of the modular architecture based on exclusion and 
governance is its very flexibility where it is needed. Thus, the basic trespassory 
regime can retain its exclusionary aspects while accommodating exceptions 
for public policy and antidiscrimination.72 Nor is it the case that standardi-
zation and formalism favor entrenched interests: it is the well-advised and 
well-connected who can craft exceptions for themselves and bend official 
discretion in their favor. Later, I will return to the false consciousness 
surrounding change in the trespassory regime, but it bears emphasizing that 
a modular architecture is not a method of preventing change but rather of 
achieving it with minimal disruption to the system. Despite the rhetoric of 
Realism, there has been little reason to revisit the more architectural 
features of property law. 
IV. PSEUDO CHANGES IN DOCTRINE 
When considering the impact of Legal Realism on property it is  
important to separate rhetoric from reality. A number of changes that 
purport to alter the architecture of the property system do so only apparently. 
Nowhere is this false appearance of change more operative than in  
trespass. As noted earlier, the modular architecture of property based on 
exclusion refined by governance is well suited to accommodating a wide 
variety of changes, leaving major remodularizations to rare interventions by 
 
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. 
& ECON. 233 (1979) (analyzing institutions of governance in contractual settings); see also Henry 
E. Smith, Community and Custom in Property, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 5, 18 (2009) 
(discussing “internal governance” in common property regimes); id. at 25-26 (discussing co-
ownership as internal governance). Indeed, Alexander’s “governance property” is similar to what 
Merrill and Smith call “entity property” that allows for a shift from relative reliance on exclusion 
to internal governance. Compare Gregory S. Alexander, supra note 71, at 1856 (defining “governance 
property” as requiring “governance norms” as opposed to a clear right of exclusion), with THOMAS 
W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, supra note 46, at 646 (positing the category of entity property, 
which allows a shift from exclusion to governance). To return to Dagan, his prime example of 
judicial innovation is the court’s acceptance of assessment covenants in Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n 
v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 798 (N.Y. 1938). See generally Hanoch Dagan, 
Private Law Pluralism and the Rule of Law (discussing structural pluralism in private law), in 
PRIVATE LAW AND THE RULE OF LAW 158, 160-66 (Lisa M. Austin & Dennis Klimchuk eds., 
2014). This is consistent with the notion of entity property and the architecture of property—
internal governance is at stake, quite apart from the issue that common interest communities 
required legislation to really gain traction. 
72 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 46, at 409-49 (discussing exceptions to the right to 
exclude from public policy and antidiscrimination laws); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. 
SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY 79-84 (2010) (discussing 
antidiscrimination laws and their implications for the right to exclude). 
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the legislature—or true revolutionaries.73 Thus, it is in no way inconsistent 
with the modular architecture of property to institute a new governance 
rule to deal with a new externality. For example, new developments lead to 
judicial decisions to alter the law of nuisance, when new ways of irritating 
people or new technologies are introduced. Likewise, covenants and zoning 
were instituted to govern situations that nuisance supposedly could not deal 
with. Antidiscrimination laws altered the scope of public accommodations, 
and over time have added new protected classes, notably in Title II of the 
Civil Rights Act of 196474 and in the Fair Housing Act of 1968.75 
But the post-realist impact on trespass law purports to go further. The 
idea is that context is so important that whether an owner should be able to 
exclude should be evaluated on an ongoing basis for reasonableness. In a 
sense this is true, in that the common law can make room for new excep-
tions to trespass if they are important enough; consider, for example, the 
defense of necessity or various customs of access such as hunting on open 
land. But post-Realism often wants more; in the post-realist view, trespass 
should be some sort of balancing test. A symbol for this point of view is the 
New Jersey Supreme Court case of State v. Shack, which held that the law of 
criminal trespass did not extend to allowing a farmer to prevent aid workers 
from visiting migrant farm workers housed on his farm. 76  The court  
declared that “[p]roperty rights serve human values. They are recognized to 
 
73 See Smith, supra note 2, at 1724 (“The literature on modular systems suggests that they are 
very good at evolving through a range of environments, but they can be trapped at a local 
maximum. Evolutionarily, one may not be able to get to a new optimum by the kinds of tinkering 
that parties and courts can do to the modular structure. For major changes remodularization is 
necessary. In our legal system this type of change is typically channeled to legislatures.” (citations 
omitted)); Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 969 (2009) (arguing that the modular 
architecture of exclusion-based property rules, rather than elevating the market above all else, 
allows for a humane balance between micromanaging and decentralized reform); Henry E. Smith, 
Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2006) 
(“Forming a modular system involves partially closing off some parts of the system and allowing 
these encapsulated components to interconnect only in certain ways. This allows work to go on in 
parallel and facilitates certain kinds of innovation and evolution for a simple reason: adjustment 
can happen within modules without causing major ripple effects. More sweeping change can call 
for remodularization, but much can be accomplished without altering the modular setup. Crucially, 
human understanding of any system is enhanced by breaking it up . . . into modules.”); see also 
Chang & Smith, supra note 39, at 52 (noting that changing the style of a property system requires 
large-scale intervention by legislatures and autocratic sovereigns). 
74 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–2000a-6 (2012); see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (finding the Civil Rights Act of 1964 constitutional). 
75 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2013) (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968). 
76 277 A.2d 369, 372-75 (N.J. 1971); see also Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 73, at 982-84 
(discussing Shack and its implications for the right to exclude).  
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that end, and are limited by it. Title to real property cannot include dominion 
over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the  
premises.”77 From this, it jumped to the conclusion that categories should 
not matter in property: 
We see no profit in trying to decide upon a conventional category and then 
forcing the present subject into it. That approach would be artificial and 
distorting. The quest is for a fair adjustment of the competing needs of the 
parties, in the light of the realities of the relationship between the migrant 
worker and the operator of the housing facility.78  
An alternative would have been to deem the workers to be tenants who had 
a right under landlord–tenant law to visitors, as the Maine Supreme Court 
did.79 Likewise, legislation such as that in Illinois solved the problem 
presented by Shack by providing for an exception to trespass.80 (Further, in 
a civil law—rather than criminal law, context—considerations of unclean 
hands and tort make the farmer an unlikely claimant, either for an injunc-
tion or damages.81) Shack amounts to a narrow exception, but post-Realists 
and progressives have made the case famous for its flirtation with an ex post 
reasonableness test for the right to exclude.82  
Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court has engaged in fits of balancing 
in the context of leafleting, 83  and even card counting. 84  Nevertheless, 
 
77 277 A.2d at 372. 
78 Id. at 374. 
79 See State v. DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891, 894 (Me. 1995) (“We conclude that . . . DeCoster’s 
employees are tenants under Maine law and as such have a right to quiet enjoyment, which 
includes a right to receive visitors in their homes.”). 
80 See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-3(c) (2012) (“This Section [of the criminal trespass statute] 
does not apply to any person . . . invited by [a] migrant worker or other person so living on such 
land to visit him or her at the place he is so living upon the land.”). 
81 See Ronald Sullivan, 2 Poverty Aids Seized at New Jersey Migrants’ Camp, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
7, 1970, at 19 (“The farmer, Morris Tedesco, lunged at the reporter, striking a camera against his 
face. ‘I’ll smash you for this, I’m going to get you for this,’ Mr. Tedesco said. ‘This is my 
property. You can’t come in here looking around.’”). 
82 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 808-10 (2009) (analyzing State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971), as an 
example of decisionmaking directly based on “human flourishing”); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land 
Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 883 (2009) (“I will discuss State v. Shack in a bit more detail 
because the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in the case exemplifies, in many ways, the rich 
pluralism of the approach I am advocating.”); Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: 
Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 32-33 (1984) (applauding the opinion in State v. Shack for 
being forthright about its use of social context to justify its result). 
83 Compare State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 630, 633 (N.J. 1980) (using a multifactor test to 
hold that a private university with a policy of open access cannot exclude peaceful leafletters), with 
State v. Guice, 621 A.2d 553, 554, 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (applying the Schmid test 
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despite its announcement that “[p]roperty owners have no legitimate 
interest in unreasonably excluding particular members of the public when 
they open their premises for public use,”85 New Jersey trespass law remains, 
much as it was before, as an exclusionary regime, especially when the 
entrant is not a member of the general public.86  
More generally, much commentary is wildly out of sync with case law 
when it comes to the law of trespass. In the parallel universe of academic 
writings, it might be plausible to suggest that trespass should be subject to 
reasonableness balancing like fair use in copyright,87 or that intruders should 
not be count as trespassers until owners object explicitly or implicitly,88 or 
that trespass protects the owner’s agenda-setting authority, and thus does 
not extend to meritorious invasions for convenience.89 But none of these 
 
and holding that a private trade school without a policy of open access can exclude individuals who 
intend to distribute political literature). 
84 See Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, 445 A.2d 370, 376 (N.J. 1982) (rejecting a casino’s efforts 
to exclude an individual who employed card-counting strategies in the absence of regulations 
permitting casinos to do so by the state regulatory commission). The court makes reference to the 
idea that the right to exclude has roots in post-Reconstruction discrimination, id. at 374 n.4, but 
this theory is controversial. Compare A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, and Jim Crow: 
Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 53, 62-74 (2005) 
(arguing that by the mid-nineteenth century, the common law imposed special duties to serve only 
on businesses that served travelers), with Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public 
Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1312-31 (1996) (contending that 
before the Civil War all businesses open to the public were subject to a duty to serve). See generally 
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 46, at 406-49 (discussing the development of public policy 
exceptions to the right to exclude); Smith, Mind the Gap, supra note 73, at 984-85 n.137 (arguing 
that the historical tie between exclusion and racial discrimination is questionable and noting that, 
even if the relationship were proven, “it is quite doubtful the court[s] . . . would be willing to 
judge other laws, such as various labor regulations, on the original motivations of their  
proponents”). In England, the right of business patrons was quite strong until the early twentieth 
century. Wood v. Leadbitter, (1945) 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Exch. Div.), overruled by Hurst v. Pictures 
Theatres, Ltd., [1915] 1 K.B. 1 (C.A. 1914). 
85 Uston, 445 A.2d at 375.  
86 See Marzocca v. Ferone, 461 A.2d 1133, 1136-37 (N.J. 1983) (holding that a racetrack  
retained the common law right to exclude, limited by public policy, and distinguishing Uston on 
the ground that it involved a member of the public); see also Comm. for a Better Twin Rivers v. 
Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n, 929 A.2d 1060, 1072-73 (N.J. 2007) (applying the Schmid 
standard to a common-interest community and finding no free-speech violation). 
87 See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Fair Trespass, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1094 (2011) (“By developing 
a balancing test to assess trespass claims, the proposed doctrine seeks to protect the rights of 
property owners on the basis of a more explicit and predictable framework, while at the same time 
safeguarding the societal interests in access.”). 
88 See, e.g., Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, The Fault of Trespass, 65 U. TORONTO L.J., no. 1, 
2015, at 48, 97-98 (advocating placing some responsibility on owners to avoid trespasses). 
89 See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 302-
03 (2008) (“[T]here is no general right to exclude; others owe the owner a duty of exclusion where 
her agenda for the resource requires it.”). Katz sees the famous case of Jacque v. Steinberg Homes, 
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ideas accords with the case law on the subject,90 and I predict none of them 
will come to fruition. 
What appears to have more traction in the caselaw is the assimilation of 
nuisance to trespass (or vice versa). Thus some courts have questioned 
whether there should be a distinction between trespass and nuisance. In 
cases of extreme nuisance, some litigants have tried to convince courts to 
apply the law of trespass, with mixed success.91 Self-consciously “modern” 
courts have tried this approach, sometimes claiming that it is more scientific.92 
On that view, the consequences of an invasion should not turn on whether 
it is direct and tangible (visible to the naked eye) or not. Nonetheless, 
courts taking this approach do not apply this new trespass with strict 
liability or to de minimis invasions, but rather they require nuisance-like 
actual and substantial damages,93 or even a balancing-of-interests analysis.94 
 
upholding a punitive damages award in a case of only nominal damages against a mobile home 
company that drove across the Jacque’s property over their objections to deliver a mobile home, as 
wrongly decided. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). She contrasts Jacque with Dwyer v. Staunton, which 
she sees as the opposite result on “similar facts.” [1947] 4 D.L.R. 393 (Alberta Dist. Ct.); Katz, 
supra note 89, at 303. This is doubtful. Dwyer is a routine necessity case, because the public road 
was made impassible by snow. The unpassable road in Jacque was private, and therefore the 
doctrine of necessity did not apply.  
90 This is hardest to say in the case of Dorfman and Jacobs, supra note 88, but their approach 
would seem to have normative implications for the contours of trespass law different from current 
caselaw. 
91 See, e.g., Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527-28 (Ala. 1979) (allowing trespass to 
be indirect); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 792-94 (Or. 1959) (sustaining finding 
of trespass by fluoride compounds in gas and particle forms); Bradley v. Am. Smelting & Ref. 
Co., 709 P.2d 782, 787-88 (Wash. 1985) (allowing trespass to be indirect). However, the traditional 
and majority position keeps the torts distinct. See, e.g., Adams v. Cleveland–Cliffs Iron Co., 602 
N.W.2d 215, 222 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“Recovery for trespass to land in Michigan is available 
only upon proof of an unauthorized direct or immediate intrusion of a physical, tangible object 
onto land over which the plaintiff has a right of exclusive possession.”). See generally Thomas W. 
Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 26-35 
(1985) (identifying “[f]our distinct threshold tests applied by common-law courts to delimit the 
sphere of trespass from that of nuisance”). 
92 See, e.g., Martin, 342 P.2d at 793 (justifying a “modern” approach by observing that “in 
this atomic age even the uneducated know the great and awful force contained in the atom and 
what it can do to a man’s property if it is released. In fact, the now famous equation E = mc2 has 
taught us that mass and energy are equivalents and that our concept of ‘things’ must be  
reframed”). Another more mundane motivation for these rulings may be that the statute of 
limitations for nuisance is typically shorter than that for trespass. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 
46, at 947-48 (noting that the courts in Martin and Borland mentioned that the plaintiffs had 
passed the statutory time bar for nuisance but not for trespass). 
93 See Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529 (“[T]here is a point where the entry is so lacking in  
substance that the law will refuse to recognize it . . . .”); Bradley, 709 P.2d at 791 (“No useful 
purpose would be served by sanctioning actions in trespass by every landowner within a hundred 
miles of a manufacturing plant.”); Martin, 342 P.2d at 795 (“There are adjudicated cases which 
have refused to find a trespass where the intrusion is clearly established but where the court has 
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Instead, the features of nuisance tend to reappear under a new guise; this is 
one reason that some courts have rejected this modern approach. The 
change is not widespread, and under the functional pressure to have an 
architecture that makes some invasions count as automatic violations and 
others handled through fine-tuned controls—exclusion versus governance—
the old structures live on. 
Indeed, nuisance itself appears to be about more than balancing. As I 
have argued elsewhere, nuisance appears more fragmented and arbitrary 
than it is, because it contains within it the shift from exclusion to governance.95 
Assimilating nuisance to negligence and deemphasizing boundary crossing 
may be realist and Coasean on the surface, but doing so ignores the coher-
ence lent to nuisance by the role that exclusion plays in it. Much of nui-
sance is mini-trespass, and otherwise it constitutes a fine-tuning of the 
exclusionary regime through governance. 
Closely related to trespass and nuisance is the ad coelum rule96—one who 
owns the surface owns upward and downward indefinitely. This works well 
most of the time, but came under pressure with the advent of airplane 
overflights. Because courts were worried about possible compensation 
claims by landowners if their trespass claims were abolished, courts implau-
sibly denied that ad coelum ever was the law.97 Merrill and I have termed 
 
felt that the possessor’s interest should not be protected.”); cf. John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 959 
A.2d 551, 555 (Vt. 2008) (recognizing a problem with the modern view and finding that no 
trespass occurred because there was no “physical impact” on the plaintiff’s property). See generally 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 13 (5th ed. 1984). Traditional trespass usually does not 
feature a de minimis exception.  
94 Martin, 342 P.2d at 795; see also Bradley, 709 P.2d at 787. For general discussion, see  
Adams, 602 N.W.2d at 219-21. 
95 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 
965, 1023-24 (2004) (explaining how the shift from exclusion to governance is located within the 
law of nuisance). 
96 The full maxim is cuius est solum eius usque ad coelum et ad inferos, which means “whoever 
owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES *18; see also Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“At common law, 
the owner of real property was considered to own from the center of earth to the top of the sky.” 
(citation omitted)); Andrea B. Carroll, Examining a Comparative Law Myth: Two Hundred Years of 
Riparian Misconception, 80 TUL. L. REV. 901, 907-16 (2006) (tracing the evolution of the ad coelum rule). 
97 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1946) (“It is ancient doctrine that at 
common law ownership of the land extended to the periphery of the universe—Cujus est solum ejus 
est usque ad coelum. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world.” (citation omitted)); 
Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 757 (9th Cir. 1936) (“[I]f we should adopt [ad coelum] as 
being the law, there might be serious doubt as to whether a state statute could change it without 
running counter to the Fourteenth [A]mendment to the Constitution of the United States. If we 
could accept and literally construe the ad coelum doctrine, it would simplify the solution of this 
case; however, we reject that doctrine. We think it is not the law, and that it never was the law.”). 
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this “rhetorical excess” for two reasons.98 First, it was not necessary to go 
that far in order to accommodate airplanes. Rather, one could declare that 
public navigation has a dynamic aspect and forms a public-rights limit on 
private property in land (here, one expanding with technological change). 
Or one might invoke implicit in-kind compensation or notions of usefulness 
and reciprocity.99 Or one might say that the ad coelum rule had no need to 
be more precise than it was until airplanes were invented and that courts 
then clarified the details. This notion of clarification is, of course, subject to 
abuse by opportunistic parties and judges, but it remains clarification, not 
abolition.  
The second reason that the denial of the ad coelum rule is misleading is 
that it still operates for other types of invasions, including in lower airspace. 
Ad coelum is especially strong for subsurface invasions where there is no 
similar tendency to make exceptions. For example, caves have been subject 
to the strict rule despite the obvious bilateral monopoly problems. 100 
Rhetoric diverges from reality in ad coelum, and the older architecture is 
largely still intact, because it is highly convenient most of the time. 
V. THE PARTIAL FLATTENING OF PROPERTY LAW 
What changes have occurred in areas close to the architecture of property 
are really half changes stemming from a flattening of private law. The 
modern approach sometimes stems from ignorance of a more articulated 
earlier law. 
A prime example, again, is nuisance. The reasonableness tests of  
nuisance law replaced an older approach, under the banner of sic utere, that 
took the rights on both sides as presumptive and engaged in equitable-style 
balancing to reconcile them.101 Perhaps because this older law sounded in 
 
98 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 46, at 296. 
99 See Eric R. Claeys, On the Use and Abuse of Overflight Column Doctrine, 2 BRIGHAM-
KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 61 (2013) (arguing that common law ad coelum maxim based in 
productive labor and natural rights was able to accommodate airplane overflights); Richard A. 
Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 147, 154-55 
(2005) (arguing that some actions, such as electronic transmissions, should not qualify as 
trespasses or nuisances because they are reciprocal in nature across multiple property owners).  
100 See, e.g., Edwards v. Sims, 24 S.W.2d 619, 620-21 (Ky. 1929) (applying ad coelum to  
underground caves); see also Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross, 10 N.E.2d 917, 920-21 (Ind. 1937) 
(determining whether a cave was subject to an adverse possession claim and, in so doing, assuming 
that the land under property was subject to the owner’s dominion).  
101 See Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 576-77 (1876) (“It is a general rule that every per-
son may exercise exclusive dominion over his own property. . . . But this general right of 
property has its exceptions and qualifications.”). The full maxim is “sic utere ut alienum non laedas,” 
or “so use your property as not to harm others’.” 
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natural rights (not of necessity, I would argue), and because it did not invite 
courts to engage in wide-ranging policymaking, courts flattened this  
two-stage process into an overall balancing test.102 As discussed earlier, this 
does not mean balancing all the time, much less detailed cost–benefit 
analysis.103 Indeed, boundary crossing, violation of community norms, and 
the like still hold sway. But it is hard to deny that when the Realists derided 
the sic utere maxim they were up to something. At the very least, they 
managed to obscure the structure of the older law such that now there is 
much more confusion in this area. It should be noted that this is nevertheless 
truer in nuisance, which is less in rem, than in trespass, which is closely 
associated with in rem rights. 
Even worse is the muddle surrounding the law of injunctions. Continuing 
with the theme of nuisance, notable “modern” cases like Boomer v. Atlantic 
Cement got the earlier law wrong.104 There was no automatic injunction rule 
for nuisances; instead, courts would apply a presumption for an injunction 
once a violation was found that could be rebutted by the defense of undue 
hardship (or disproportionate hardship).105 This did not mean equipoise but 
rather a gross disparity in hardship, in that the proposed injunction would 
benefit the movant far less than the hardship on the enjoined party; it is a 
safety valve.106 This approach has been further obscured recently by the 
Supreme Court with its four-factor test in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.107 Despite its claimed consistency with “well-established principles 
of equity,”108 the test does not make clear that disproportionate hardship is a 
defense, nor does it even mention good faith, an important consideration 
under the older approach to injunctions. 109  Ironically, the traditional 
 
102 Often the touchstone for this proposition is the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 821D, 821F, 822 (1979).  
103 See Smith, supra note 95 and accompanying text.  
104 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). 
105 See Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train 
Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L., no. 3, 2012, at 1, 4-5 (describing the undue 
hardship defense); see also HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
EQUITY 51 (2d ed. 1948) (observing that, when “the award of specific relief would inflict a 
hardship on the defendant which is out of all proportion to the injury its refusal would cause to 
plaintiff[,] . . . the great weight of authority” holds that “equity still has discretion in adjusting 
the relief to be rewarded”). The right to an injunction is distinct from the right to exclude. See 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic 
Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 638-60 (2008). 
106 See generally Smith, supra note 27.  
107 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
108 Id. 
109 See generally Mark P. Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for 
Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203 (2012) (arguing that eBay’s four-factor test is an 
inadvisable innovation).  
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approach is well suited to dealing with the “patent trolls” which were the 
issue in eBay itself.110 
 
*      *      * 
 
Other examples of flattening relate to unjust enrichment and tracing. In 
the area of private law, Kull has argued for the applicability of the 
Holmesian aphorism about ignorance as a law reformer.111 As a result of 
changes in the curriculum and general lack of attention since the days of 
Legal Realism, pockets of private law, like restitution, have become simpler 
because litigants and judges are unaware of earlier sophisticated bodies of 
law. Relevant to property is the tendency to overcome property baselines in 
insolvencies following common scheme frauds.112  
The older approach was to protect property claims (and trace into  
proceeds) unless there was a good reason, like a good faith purchaser, to 
stop. More recently, courts have floundered around with various sharing 
approaches. For example, if victims of a common fraud are similarly 
situated, they will sometimes be made to share losses even if some claimants 
could identify their property and trace proceeds. There is little theory to 
back up this intuition, and in some contexts the newer approach may be 
justified. But a genuine change has occurred due to ignorance. Is this 
architectural? It is hard to gauge its significance, but it is a move away from 
a very general approach to property baselines. Time will tell how far this 
can proceed. 
 
*      *      * 
 
Finally, a disturbing candidate for simplification from ignorance comes 
from the recent financial crisis. In the rush to securitize mortgages, the 
property aspect of the mortgage and issues of third party notice and  
 
110 See id. at 243-49 (arguing that traditional principles of equity provide a better solution to 
the problems of “patent trolls” than the approach adopted by eBay). See generally Henry E. Smith, 
Property as Platform: Coordinating Standards for Technological Innovation, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & 
ECON. 1057 (2013) (arguing that traditional property principles may provide solutions to 
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standardization were systematically ignored.113 Arguably, this led to the 
opacity in the assets that fed the panic: no one knew just how toxic the 
assets really were. Further, allowing for complexity in the forms leads to 
informational externalities that designers will not necessarily take into 
account.114 The lessons of the numerus clausus—and complexity externalities 
in particular—were not taken to heart in this area. Yes, intangible assets are 
more important in the modern economy and complexity has increased, but 
we need to be aware of how private law and property in particular can 
manage this complexity and the informational problems to which it gives 
rise. 
CONCLUSION 
The system of property law endures. Because property law does what 
contract alone cannot—furnish a modular platform for horizontal interac-
tions with respect to things—change in property law has largely taken place 
within this system. Apart from the major remodularizations that legislatures 
and autocrats have historically undertaken, the kind of reforms that the 
Realists advocated—amidst misleadingly soaring antiformalist rhetoric—
have largely taken place in the more in personam and intermediate areas of 
property rather than in its most in rem aspects. That the changes have 
occurred more in the areas of use—governance, personal relations, and the 
like—rather than in the basic exclusionary set-up or definition of a thing is 
no accident. The systemic aspects of property are the hardest to change 
because they manage complexity, promote network effects, and implicate 
information costs for numerous and far-flung parties. At the same time, 
reformists can usually achieve their goals without impacting property as a 
law of things (whatever they may say). Realist and post-realist changes, like 
those in landlord–tenant law, have been indeed important. Nevertheless, it is 
the strength of a modular system that it is a hybrid of formalism and 
contextualism, and can accommodate change while containing information 
costs. 
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